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Drummond: Implied Warrant of Habitability — Changing Privity Requirements

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY-CHANGING PRIVITY
REQUIREMENTS
Robert G. Drummond
I.

INTRODUCTION

The implied warranty of habitability in new construction is
developing into an important concept to protect home buyers. The
ordinary home buyer is not in a position, by skill or training, to
discover defects lurking in the plumbing, the electrical wiring, or
the structure itself. These defects are usually in areas that are not
open for inspection.1 Home buyers, often making the largest single
purchase of their lifetime, rely on the superior knowledge and experience of the builder to construct a home in a workmanlike manner that is suitable for habitation. As this reliance has grown,
courts have shifted away from their historical rule of caveat
emptor in the purchase of real property, and moved in the direction of finding that a builder vendor 2 impliedly warrants the workmanlike construction and habitability of the dwelling he
constructs.
The implied warranty of habitability is a theory that has only
recently emerged in Montana. The purpose of this comment is to
examine the genesis and development of the implied warranty of
habitability in Montana and the breakdown of privity requirements between the builder vendor and the subsequent purchasers
of homes. This comment also reviews and compares the standing of
the implied warranty of habitability in Montana with its standing
in other jurisdictions.
II.

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN MONTANA

The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether a builder vendor impliedly warrants the habitability and
1. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Wyo. 1975).
2. A builder vendor for purposes of this comment is an individual who is in the business of building houses designed for residential dwelling purposes upon land owned by him,
and who then sells the houses, either after they are completed or during the course of construction, together with the tracts of land upon which they are situated, to members of the
house-buying public. To be distinguished are cases in which a landowner hires a general
contractor to erect a house on the landowners' lot, in which case liability is determined by
ordinary rules of liability of an owner of land and an independent contractor and the express and implied warranties arising out of it as between the owner and the builder. Annot.
25 A.L.R.3d 383, 387 (1969).
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workmanship of a new dwelling in Chandler v. Madsen.' In Chandler, the court held that the builder vendor of a new home impliedly warrants that the residence is constructed in a workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation.4
The Chandlers purchased a house built by the defendant. The
house began settling a short time after the plaintiffs occupied the
dwelling. The house was located on moisture sensitive soil which
became compressible when wet. The presence of water in the soil
caused settling of the footings, foundation and other parts of the
house which in turn caused extensive damage to the structure.5
The Chandlers experienced problems with cracking walls and
floors and inoperative doors and windows. The settling caused the
interior of the house to become generally unsightly.
The Montana Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the
earlier Oregon case of Yepson v. Burgess' and found that the buyer
is not in equal bargaining position with the seller and is thereby
forced to rely on the seller's skill and knowledge regarding the habitability of the house.7 The Montana court reasoned that while the
doctrine of caveat emptor developed at a time when the buyer and
3. Chandler v. Madsen, 197 Mont. 234, 642 P.2d 1028 (1982).
4. In adopting the implied warranty of habitability with its holding in Chandler the
Montana Supreme Court joined several other jurisdictions that have also held the builder
vendor impliedly warrants the workmanship and habitability of a dwelling he builds. See,
e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Woodward v. Chirco Constr.
Co., Inc., __
Ariz.
-, 687 P.2d 1269 (1985); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449
S.W.2d 922 (1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 115 Cal. Rptr.
648, 525 P.2d 88 (1974); Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983);
Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970); Smith v. Berwin Builders,
Inc., 287 A.2d 693 (Del. 1972); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 445 P.2d 698 (1966); Park v. Sohn, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651
(1982); Crowley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); Banville v. Huckens, 407
A.2d 294 (Me. 1979); Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (1979);
Allison v. Home Say. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Weeks v. Slavick Builders,
Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970);
Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1978); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479
S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Norton v. Burleavd, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 780, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); DeRoche v. Dame, 75 App. Div. 2d
384, 430 N.Y.S.2d 390, app. dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 821, 433 N.Y.S.2d 427, 413 N.E.2d 366
(1980); Griffin v. Wheeler Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976); Dobler v.
Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Homes Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761
(Okla. 1978); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974); Lane v. Trumholm Bldg.
Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154
N.W.2d 803 (1967); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973);
Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646
S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975); Klos V. Gockel,
87 Wash.2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); Tavares, 542 P.2d 1275.
5. Chandler, 197 Mont. at 237, 642 P.2d at 1030.
6. Yepsen, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019.
7. Chandler, 197 Mont. at 239, 642 P.2d at 1031.
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seller of real estate enjoyed equal bargaining positions,8 that equality of position no longer existed and that the builder was in a better position to examine and discover defects.9 The builder, therefore, should bear the loss because he is in a better position to avoid
problems linked to defects in the construction of the dwelling.
III.

EXTENDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

In Degnan v. Executive Homes"0 the Montana court determined whether privity of contract must exist between the builder
vendor and purchaser before the implied warranty of habitability
becomes effective. This was a case of first impression in Montana.
The Degnan court examined the theories underlying the implied
warranty and extended it to parties who lacked privity of contract.
In that case the plaintiff was the purchaser of a new home and the
defendant Mora Brothers, Inc. was the builder. The plaintiff
Degnan purchased the home from Executive Homes who in turn
contracted with Mora Brothers, Inc. to build the home. The
Degnans moved into the home shortly after it was completed by
Mora Brothers, Inc. After the Degnans moved into the home, it
sustained structural damage when the entire hillside upon which it
was built began shifting, slowly moving downward. The foundation
broke and forced the Degnans to vacate the premises. The
Degnans filed suit against the sellers, selling agent, engineering
12
firm, and builders.
The trial court denied the Degnans' motion for summary judgment because it found an unresolved issue of material
fact-whether or not Mora Brothers, Inc. was a builder vendor.
The court did grant a second motion for summary judgment on the
issue of implied warranty of habitability. 3 Mora Brothers, Inc., appealed, contending that the district court erred in finding that
there was a breach of an implied warranty of habitability and in
granting summary judgment because the parties lacked privity of
contract.
The Montana Supreme Court found that an implied warranty
of habitability did exist. The court relied on its earlier decision in
8. Id. at 238, 642 P.2d at 1031.
9. Id. at 239, 642 P.2d at 1031.
Mont. __,
696 P.2d 431 (1985).
10. Degnan v. Executive Homes, Inc., 11. Privity for purposes of this comment shall be defined as the connection or relationship that exists between two contracting parties.
12. Degnan, - Mont. -, 696 P.2d 431.
13. Id. at , 696 P.2d at 434.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986

3

Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 47REVIEW
[1986], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA

[Vol. 47

Chandler1 4 as the basis for its holding. It reaffirmed that the
builder can better determine the effect, if any, of constructing a
house on unstable ground. The case was analogous to Chandler in
that the defects arose from constructing the house on unstable
ground.
The second important issue addressed by the Montana Supreme Court was whether privity of contract is necessary for the
builder vendor to be liable under the theory of implied warranty of
habitability. The court found privity of contract unnecessary and
held that builder vendors may be liable to subsequent purchasers
under the theory of implied warranty of habitability. 15 In doing so
the court has correctly reasoned that the implied warranty of habitability does not depend upon a contract for its existence but,
rather, is an idea born in tort.
In Degnan, 6 the Appellant Mora Brothers relied upon contract theory and argued that the implied warranty of habitability
extends only to parties in privity of contract. Mora Brothers relied
upon an earlier Montana Supreme Court decision and stated that a
party to a contract must be in privity with the party from whom
he is seeking recovery. Referring to State v. District Court" as it
cited Hyink v. Low Line Irrigation Co.,' 8 they contended the parties must occupy a contract status towards each other, and that to
recover, privity of contract must exist.
The supreme court completely rejected the contract theory
and found the privity argument inapplicable to the theories under
which the plaintiff was attempting recovery. Mora Brothers ignored the possibility that the court would consider the warranty
under tort theories. Their argument was logical, however, because
the Chandler decision had suggested that the implied warranty
was a contractual theory rather than a theory arising out of tort
concepts.' 9
The Degnans relied primarily upon a case handed down from
the Court of Appeals of Washington in arguing in favor of extending the implied warranty to subsequent purchase of homes.
14. Chandler, 197 Mont. 234, 642 P.2d 1028.
15. Degnan, Mont. __,
696 P.2d 431.
16. Id.
17. 148 Mont. 350, 420 P.2d 845 (1966).
18. 62 Mont. 401, 205 P. 236 (1922).
19. The court stated "We agree with the Oregon Supreme Court which stated in Yepson that 'the essence of the transaction between a builder vendor and a buyer is an implicit
agreement that the seller will transfer a house which is suitable for habitation.'" Chandler,
197 Mont. at 239, 642 P.2d at 1031 (citing Yepson, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1022).
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The case of Gay v. Cornwall ° was similar to Degnan; the plaintiffs
had been the first occupants of a new house, but had not purchased the dwelling from the builder. That court imposed liability
on the defendant builder without regard to privity.2 1 The Degnans
used Gay to demonstrate that Mora Brothers were builder vendors
and could be held liable in the absence of privity of contract. The
Montana court, however, went beyond the reasoning of Gay, and
determined that breach of seller's implied warranty is a tort and
torts do not require privity of contract.22
The Montana court has joined other jurisdictions which have
held that the warranty arises out of tort concepts rather than contract concepts. It recognized that while warranty exhibits characteristics of both tort and contract principles, the implied warranty
is a legal duty, the breach of which is a tort.23 The court reasoned
that torts do not require privity of contract and clarified what had
proven to be a confusing concept. Its action has followed other
courts that have extended the implied warranty of habitability to
subsequent purchasers. Some courts, however, have limited their
extension of the implied warranty and still others have refused to
extend it beyond the first purchaser.
IV.

THEORIES UNDERLYING EXTENDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS

The same logic used to extend the implied warranty of habitability to first purchasers can be used to extend the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers. The Indiana Supreme Court, in
Barnes v. MacBrown & Co.,24 reasoned that lack of privity would
not preclude a plaintiff's recovery on the theory of the implied
warranty of habitability. That court reasoned that privity need not
exist in a warranty action based on a defect in personal property.
It further reasoned that the same logic which had been applied to
change the common law in personal property warranty actions
20. 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972).
21. Id. at 598, 494-P.2d at 1374.
22. The court cited PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 95 at 634-35 (4th ed. 1982) saying:
The seller warranty is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract, unique in the law. In its inception the habitability was based on tort.
Thereafter the warranty gradually came to be regarded as a term of the contract
of sale, express or implied, for which the normal remedy is a contract action. But
the obligation is imposed upon the seller, not because he has assumed it voluntarily, but because the law attaches such consequences to his conduct irrespective of
any agreement; and in many cases, at least, the language of pure fiction.
Degnan, - Mont. at __,
696 P.2d at 435.
23. Degnan, - Mont. -, 696 P.2d at 435.
24. Barns v. MacBrown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
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could be extended to real property. The Indiana court was one of
the first to recognize the requirement of privity as outmoded in
real property actions. 5
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court found the privity requirement outmoded. It reasoned in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf that
the subsequent purchaser relies on the expertise of the builder as
much as the initial purchaser.26 Like the initial purchaser, the subsequent purchaser has little opportunity to inspect the construction methods used in building the home. The subsequent purchaser usually lacks knowledge of construction practices, and must,
to a substantial degree, rely upon the expertise of the person who
built the home. If construction of a new house is defective, the responsible builder vendor who created the latent defect should bear
27
the repair cost.
In holding that the implied warranty extended beyond the initial purchaser of the home, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized
that we are an increasingly mobile people. A builder vendor should
know the house he builds might be resold within a relatively short
period of time and should not expect that the warranty will be limited by the number of days that the original owner chooses to hold
onto the property. The Redarowicz court, however, carefully confined its decision to latent defects which manifest themselves
within a reasonable time after the purchase of the house. 8
Similarly, in its decision of Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc.29
the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the protection afforded
the initial purchaser of a home should be extended to subsequent
purchasers. The Wyoming Court referred to its earlier decision of
Tavares v. Horstman3° where it had stated that those who buy
homes are entitled to rely upon the skill of the builder and that
the house should be constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its
intended use. "We can find no reason not to apply the basic concepts leading to establishment of the rules of Tavares to builders
generally, and to a purchaser subsequent to the first owner." 31
The Wyoming court determined that those who hold them25. Id.
26. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 183, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982).
27. Id. at 412, 441 N.W.2d at 331. The Illinois court reasoned the public policies underlying the implied warranty of habitability should not be frustrated because of short intervening ownership of the first purchaser; in these circumstances the implied warranty of
habitability survives a change of ownership.
28. Id.
29. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
30. Tavares, 542 P.2d at 1275.
31. Moxley, 600 P.2d at 735.
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selves out as builders must be just as accountable for the workmanship that goes into a home that a buyer or his successor expect
to occupy in the years that follow as are builder developers. It recognized the realities that homes change hands frequently and that
a subsequent buyer should also be protected if he takes possession
of the home a short time after the home was built. Because the
home can easily reach the subsequent buyer without substantial
change from its original condition, the Wyoming court extended
the principals of tort to the implied warranty of habitability. It
reasoned that upon manifestation of a defect, an implied warranty
or a right of recovery on any other ground should not be cut off by
an intervening sale. 2 Moxley v. Laramie Builders33 and Degnan v.
Executive Homes 34 demonstrate the logical step of eliminating
privity requirements in actions based on the implied warranty of
habitability. In each case the courts treated the warranty as a tort
concept rather than a contract concept.
The Indiana Supreme Court in Wagner Construction Co., Inc.
v. Noonan, 6 followed the reasoning of Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc. 36 saying:
The purpose of the warranty is to protect innocent purchasers
and to hold builders accountable for their work. With that reasoning in mind, any reasoning which would arbitrarily interpose a
first buyer as an obstruction to someone equally as deserving of
recovery is incomprehensible.
No reason has been presented to us whereby the original
owner should have the benefits of an implied warranty or a recovery on a negligence theory, and the next owner should not simply
because there has been a transfer. Such intervening sales, standing by themselves, should not, by any standard of reasonableness,
effect an end to an implied warranty or, in that matter, a right of
recovery on any other ground, upon manifestation of a defect.
The builder always has available the defense that the defects are
37
not attributable to him.
The Wagner court went on to hold that five years was not an excessive period of time for the latent defect to manifest itself 3 8
The Colorado Supreme Court considered the extension of the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Moxley, 600 P.2d 733.
Degnan, - Mont.
Wagner Constr. Co., Inc.
Moxley, 600 P.2d 733.
Wagner Constr. Co., 403
Wagner Constr. Co., 403

., 696 P.2d 431.
v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. App. 1980).
N.E.2d at 1144 (citing Moxtey, 600 P.2d 733).
N.E.2d at 1148.
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warranty to parties not in privity in Eldon v. Simmons.3 9 The
Eldon court extended the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers. The court reasoned that a manufactured product placed in the chain of distribution may literally pass through
dozens of hands before it reaches the ultimate consumer. When the
ultimate consumer finds the product to be defective, it makes little
sense to limit him to redress against his immediate vendors. If
such were the case, the consumers immediate vendor, if he were to
have the full benefit of his bargain, would have to sue his immediate vendor, who would in turn have to sue his vendor, and so on up
the chain, until the party ultimately responsible for placing a defective product in the market is reached. "It defies common sense
to require such an endless chain of litigation in order to hold the
party at fault responsible."' 0 The Colorado court compared the
purchase of a home with the purchase of any personal property. It
reasoned that warranties that extend to personal property should
also apply to homes.
A different approach was used by the Texas Supreme Court in
Gupta v. Ritter Homes.4 1 That court stated that as between the
builder and owner, it does not matter whether there has been an
intervening owner. The effect of the latent defect is just as great on
a subsequent buyer and the builder is no more able to justify his
improper work as to a subsequent owner than to the original
buyer. The Gupta court went on to reason that the implied warranty of habitability and good workmanship, implicit in the contract between the builder vendor and original purchaser, is automatically assigned to the subsequent purchaser.42
In citing its approval of extending the implied warranty of
habitability to subsequent purchasers, the Arkansas Supreme
Court expressly held that the warranty extends to subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time.4" The Arkansas court, however, limited the extension of implied warranty to a reasonable
length of time where there is no substantial change or alteration in
the condition of the building from the original sale. 4
In extending the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers, the New Jersey Superior Court in Hermes v.
39. Eldon v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739, 742 (Okla. 1981).
40. Id.
41. Gupta, 646 S.W.2d 168.
42. See Thornton Homes Inc. v. Grevner, 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1981). Gupta expressly
overruled an earlier Texas Court of Appeals decision holding that the implied warranty of
habitability did not apply in cases where the house was "used." Gupta, 646 S.W.2d at 169.
43. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981).
44. Id. at 187, 612 S.W.2d at 322.
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Staiano45 reasoned that the builder vendor was in a better position
to prevent the occurrence of major problems. The builder knows
that the systems will remain hidden to initial as well as subsequent
purchasers. Anyone else who purchases the home will rely upon the
skill and experience of the builder vendor to construct the home in
a workmanlike manner. The Hermes court recognized that often
defects will not be revealed for several years after the house is first
occupied. The effect of a defect in the systems is felt by the subsequent purchasers who should be protected by the implied warranty
of habitability.4"
V.

IMPLIED WARRANTY ARISING OUT OF CONTRACT

Some courts have held that the implied warranty of habitability and fitness arises from the contractual relation between the
builder and the first purchaser and therefore does not extend to
subsequent purchasers. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court
has continually refused to extend the implied warranty of habitability beyond the original parties to the contract. In its ruling in
Cooper & Co., Inc. v. Bryant,47 the court ruled there is no implied
warranty of habitability in the resale of used homes. Citing its earlier decision of Ray v. Montgomery, 8 the court determined that
the doctrine of caveat emptor still applied to the sale of used
homes. The Alabama court is joined by several courts which have
recently held that privity of contract is essential to recover under
49
the implied warranty.
These views are distinguished from the view of the Montana
5 ° Those courts rely on
Supreme Court as expressed in Degnan.
contract principles as the basis of their decisions and carve out exceptions based upon the unique circumstances of those cases. Prior
to Degnan,51 the Montana Supreme Court indicated that contract
principles applied in implied warranty actions. A majority of
courts, however, limit recovery under the warranty to the first purchaser-occupant of the house. This limitation is rooted in the view
5 " that the
adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in Chandler,
45. Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 535, 437 A.2d 925 (1981).
46. Id.
47. 400 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Ala. 1983).
48. 399 So. 2d 230 (Ala. 1983).
49. See also Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 417, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1985); Drexel
Properties, Inc., v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1981); Durant
-, 335 S.E.2d 162 (1985).
v. Wilmock,
- Ga. App.
50. Degnan, - Mont. at -, 696 P.2d at 431.
51. Id.
52. Chandler, 197 Mont. at 239, 642 P.2d at 1034.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986

9

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 47
[1986], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 47

warranty of habitability arises from a contract and is subject to
traditional contract principles. Privity is one such principle which
most courts are not willing to stretch beyond the first purchaser.5 3
V.

CONCLUSION

Chandler, 4
5

In
the court only acknowledged the existence of
the implied warranty and the fact that the theory of caveat emptor
had become outmoded. The Chandler55 opinion implies that contract principles would apply to the warranty. Degnan5" represents
a turnabout from that stance. The Montana court in Degnan" recognized and addressed the confusion regarding whether the implied warranty is a tort or contract concept, and in so doing has
correctly extended the implied warranty of habitability to parties
not in privity of contract. This is significant where a subsequent
purchaser, rather than the original vendee, seeks recovery premised upon the implied warranty. 8 The Montana Supreme Court
has cut through the confusion and correctly applied tort concepts
to the warranty. The application of tort concepts should allow subsequent purchasers to recover in actions for breach of the warranty. In doing so the Montana court has also opened the door for
new disputes in the future. The court left open the issues of what
length of time would be appropriate for application of the implied
warranty to subsequent purchasers. While several jurisdictions
have simply held that the standard of reasonableness will apply in
limiting the time in which latent defects must manifest themselves,
the Montana court in Degnan did not have to deal with the issue
of how long after construction of the home the builder vendor remains liable for latent defects. "The issue of who may recover
under the warranty will depend on the duration of the warranty
which in part depends on the nature of the defects. '59 A logical
conclusion would allow recovery by subsequent purchasers for latent defects that manifest themselves within a reasonable time after construction. While the case of Degnan60 is not the typical case
which would demonstrate that the implied warranty would be ex53. Toole and Habein, The Warranty of Habitability: A Bill of Rights for
Homebuyers, 44 MONT. L. REV. 165, 166 (1983). See also, e.g., Mellander v. Killeen, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (1980).
54. Chandler, 197 Mont. 234, 642 P.2d 1028.
55. Id.
56. Degnan, - Mont. -, 696 P.2d 431.
57. Id.
58. Comment, Builders' Liability, 55 STAN. L. REV. 615 (1980).
59. Toole and Habein, supra note 54, at 166.
60. Degnan, - Mont. __,
696 P.2d 431.
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tended beyond the parties to the contract, the court made it clear
that the implied warranty will be treated as a tort concept rather
than contract concept, thereby allowing extension to persons not in
privity of contract.
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